



DATE: January 7, 2014

TO: Ames Laboratory Personnel

FROM: Mark Murphy
Chief Operations Officer,

SUBJECT: Annual Counterintelligence Awareness Briefing

Although the Ames Laboratory does not perform classified research and very few of our staff hold security clearances, we are still part of the DOE laboratory complex, and we are aware that we are occasionally probed in various ways by foreign intelligence services. Because of this foreign interest in the Lab, and also in accordance with DOE Orders, all personnel of the Ames Laboratory are to receive annual briefings on counterintelligence (CI) and our responsibilities as they relate to CI. Awareness of these issues helps to protect you in the event that you are targeted as a source of information.

This memo sets forth the information about which you are supposed to be briefed, and it will serve to meet the briefing requirement. Please review the memo carefully to ensure that you are aware of your responsibilities, and look over the [Guide to Counterintelligence-relevant Reporting](#) for more in-depth and situation-specific information.

DOE CI Reporting Requirement

As required by Presidential Directive, DOE has established an extensive Counterintelligence reporting system. Portions of the DOE system do not apply to the Ames Laboratory as no classified work is performed at here. However, certain requirements apply to all Lab personnel; including certain **professional**, **personal** and **financial relationship information**. These requirements are detailed below:

Professional Relationships:

Employees are required to report professional contacts and relationships with nationals of sensitive countries, whether they occur at the workplace or abroad. This requirement is most frequently met through trip reports, foreign visits and assignments forms, proposals or other formal, routine documentation of professional activity. It may also be gathered directly by a DOE Counterintelligence Officer (CIO). The DOE CIO is informed of all employees traveling to sensitive countries through the foreign travel request process, and these employees may receive pre- and post-travel debriefings by a DOE CIO at the CIO's discretion. The DOE CIO also receives copies of all of our foreign visit and assignment forms and work-for-other proposals with foreign companies to review foreign interactions. Briefings and debriefings may arise from these types of interactions, too.

The objective is not to interfere with scientific endeavors, as we respect the importance of foreign visits and visitors toward the furthering of science. The objective of our

Counterintelligence Program is to ensure proper accountability related to providing foreign scientists access to property, equipment, and computer systems associated with a U.S. Government Agency.

The Ames Laboratory and the Department of Energy's reputations could be harmed in the event of an incident if no one was aware of what a scientist was doing during a visit or assignment to the Laboratory, or by the fact that the established procedures were ignored. This would be especially true should the foreign national have come from a country where enhanced vigilance would seem prudent.

Hosting of foreign nationals does not call for constant monitoring or scrutiny, but an overall awareness along with coverage of a few basic points, and an overall Laboratory effort to take notice of anomalies.

At a minimum, the host should:

1. have met each individual they are hosting;
2. be aware of who will be supplying daily supervision/coordination, and make that person aware that he/she should report any instances of concern to the host;
3. be aware of the computer access of the visitor and if the visitor is retaining computer accesses after the visit/assignment is complete;
4. be aware of the access to physical premises the visitor/assignee has both during normal and off hours; and
5. be aware if a visit/assignment is either curtailed short of time (and why), that an assignment has been completed, or if an assignment (visit) has been extended and if the person met the goals of the visit.

Another requirement is that the DOE CIO must be informed of any foreign travel for which foreign monetary support is provided, whether to a sensitive or non-sensitive country. This is also done when the foreign travel approval forms are processed.

Any such relationships not captured through the travel or trip report mechanism, the foreign visits and assignments forms or work-for-other proposals are to be reported to Mark Murphy, Chief Operations Officer (murphy@ameslab.gov), who will inform the DOE CIO, if necessary.

Personal Relationships:

Substantive personal relationships with sensitive country foreign nationals (who are not permanent resident aliens), other than family members, are also to be reported to Mr. Murphy. A substantive relationship is one that is enduring and involves substantial sharing of personal information and/or the formation of emotional bonds. An enduring relationship is one that has existed, or is expected to exist, for a substantial period of time (months or years). Substantial sharing of personal information involves discussion of "private" information about oneself (that one would not routinely share with strangers, for instance). Emotional bonds refer to feelings of affection or emotional attachment in a relationship. Because the concepts of "personal information" and "emotional bonds" are necessarily subjective, reliance must be placed on the judgment of each individual as to the existence of, and reporting threshold, for these criteria. Examples of such relationships are provided in the attached table.

Financial Relationships:

In addition to professional and personal relationships, certain financial relationships are also reportable. Substantive business transactions with citizens of sensitive countries (who are not permanent resident aliens) are to be reported to Mr. Murphy, whether they involve one-time interactions or on-going financial relationships. The requirement pertains to non-incidental financial transactions. Small payments for such things as house cleaning or other such personal services are not included in the requirement. Partnerships or other business interests or investments are the focus of this reporting requirement, because they provide the potential for exploitation or pressure. Financial support provided to family members is not included.

Presidential Decision Directive / National Security Council – 12

PDD/NSC -12 requires us to report **any** approaches or contacts by organizations or individuals of **any** nationality, including U.S. citizens, in or out of the scope of official activities in which

1. illegal unauthorized access is sought to classified or sensitive information, technology or special nuclear materials, or
2. the individual believes that he or she may be the target of an attempted exploitation by a foreign government or any other suspicious request for information

Anyone receiving unsolicited emails from individuals in terrorist supporting or “T4” countries (Cuba, Iran, Sudan or Syria) is asked to forward a copy of the email to Mark Murphy (murphy@ameslab.gov). Please include the complete header information on any email you forward to Mr. Murphy.

We do not anticipate that you are at any personal risk from individuals from foreign countries, but adhering to the guidelines in this memo will enable our CI program to ensure that any suspicious activity is identified and managed appropriately.